

10 The three crucial types of operations in which our forces will engage are strategic raids, punitive expeditions and full-scale invasions, followed by occupations. Forget the self-imposed rule that "if you break it, you own it." While our extended presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq makes sense, we can't reconstruct every troubled society on earth. And some (think Somalia) will be so fundamentally hostile to our values that we can only punish them and leave.


While the forms of conflict are complex, ever-mutating and never fully predictable, we can project the need for brief strategic raids that strike finite targets, then leave; longer punitive expeditions that engage a more complex enemy, reduce his capabilities, then leave; and full-scale invasions, some of which will be followed by occupations.

Such operations demand an expeditionary mentality in every service, but that's only a return to

our military heritage. From the "shores of Tripoli" to the Army's campaign against the Moros, from our frontier days to clandestine special operations, we've known how to fight, win and, when appropriate, leave.


Certainly, there will be times when we wish to extend a helping hand to the opponent we knocked down. But some enemies should just be left lying there. Empires, even postmodern ones, need to be able to tell the difference. ■

Ralph Peters is a retired U.S. Army officer. The author of 20 books, including the forthcoming "New Glory," he has experience in 60 countries on six continents. This article is the first in a series on 21st-century warfare. In subsequent issues, the author will develop the themes summarized here.




An Iraqi girl carries water and food distributed by citizens of Kuwait and U.S. Army troops. Better interoperability of nongovernmental organizations and military forces was the goal of recent joint experiments.

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Train like we'll fight

Include NGOs in military exercises

BY COL. ROBERT MORRIS AND DAVE KILDEE

The global war on terrorism, the disaster assistance rendered after the December tsunami and the complex emergency taking place in the Sudan have one thing in common: they illustrate that military forces, international humanitarian agencies and other nongovernmental organizations (NGO) are becoming increasingly interdependent. Joint-force and multinational experimentation findings underscore this point and reveal an urgent need to integrate and institutionalize nongovernmental organiza-

tion participation in training, education, joint concept development and experimentation and other appropriate aspects of military operations. The only question is: How?

Joint experimentation provides key insights. One such event was the Multinational Information Operations Experiment I in December 2003, an exercise orchestrated by the German Federal Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Staff of the Bundeswehr. More than 50 experts from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United King-

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

dom, the United States and New Zealand participated, as did four NGO representatives. Participants concluded that the military could depend on NGOs' experience, knowledge of local conditions, and capabilities and skills as "valuable to identify and assess second- and third-order effects of military ac-



U.S. NAVY

U.S. sailors salvage tiles from a schoolhouse in Sri Lanka after a tsunami struck the region in December. More than 18,000 U.S. troops worked with foreign militaries and nongovernmental organizations to support the relief effort.

ization to devote the time and energy required to do all the paperwork and go through a drawn-out process."

In O'Sullivan's view, which, in the authors' opinions, reflects that of many other like-size NGOs, "It seemed rather insane that the stated goal of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) at the time was to employ people and restore order, yet they couldn't support one of the

most proven and cost-effective programs in Iraq." He eventually obtained resources through efforts of the CPA, but not as he expected.

"There was no way they could get money from USAID, so they got the Iraqi government to give us money. The CPA had no ability to spend its own money. They had to spend the Iraqi government's money. Incredible!"

IMMEDIATE IMPACT

One successful initiative in Iraq is the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Using money at the local level, senior commanders plan and execute projects for immediate impact on local issues. Along with civil affairs experts, commanders work directly with local citizens to identify immediate needs and respond with low-cost/high-impact actions to improve education, health care, electricity, water and security.

More than \$126 million was spent on grass-roots projects to quickly deal with short-term needs.

O'Sullivan's group was a CERP partner. "Of all the [U.S. government] programs, CERP funds were probably the best spent," he said. "We could have stretched those dollars and gotten three to four more times as much bang for your buck."

NGOs enable such programs to achieve their full potential. For example, and particularly in the early stages of a program, civil affairs units' payments, along with those of many other organizations, often exceed local market rates. However, even these inflated rates are much cheaper than hiring a large Western contractor who will always subcontract the work and yet still have to be paid much more to cover the expenses of private security firms, Western salaries, etc. As O'Sullivan explained, "An NGO, on the other hand, will use local engineers who are paid one-tenth that of Western engineering firms and will be able to access the local markets and negotiate with 20 to 30 vendors to get the best price."

Some in the Defense Department argue that the best solution for effective NGO coordination resides in the military's civil-military operations center (CMOC) and its recent partners in Afghanistan, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). However, PRT-stated objectives include extending the influence of the Afghan government outside Kabul, encouraging NGOs to operate in rural areas and facilitating reconstruction.

NGOs resist being party to a structure that has them extending a government's influence as a key objective. Also, the PRTs were initially ad hoc units formed to interact with NGOs and, as a result,

had ad hoc success in getting NGOs to help achieve the military's goal in a given area.

Success has been achieved only when individuals from each province's PRT and NGOs have reached terms of cooperation; however, the same NGO may have a good relationship with one PRT and a bad one with another. This potential problem is another reason why consistent and functional relationships must be forged between the military and NGOs.

CARE International's Paul Barker was recently quoted in *The Economist*: "The army does development work poorly. ... PRTs do not have the time or the training for it. Much of the work is later destroyed by Afghans who don't like foreign soldiers in their country, and anyway the main beneficiaries are militia commanders whom the soldiers want to recruit against the Taliban."

Although many NGOs embrace collaboration, they strongly oppose any mandate that it be conducted in or through government structures such as AID and the State Department. But during the SOCom experiment, participants took the position that if NGOs want anything, they should have to go to the embassy to register for consideration. Also, despite the success of military partnering, NGOs remain just as opposed to falling under military control as they do to submitting to State Department or USAID management. In either case, they rightly fear, their affiliation with governmental or military agencies jeopardizes neutrality. At the very least, it creates a perception that they have compromised their neutrality.

"You do not want to have to go to the civil-military operations center or to the embassy regardless of the nature of the humanitarian mission," O'Sullivan said. "Especially because of the problems with being seen meeting with the military, you instantly become a target." O'Sullivan knows. The co-founder of JumpStart International, Mohayman Al Safar, was assassinated in Baghdad last year, shortly after leaving a CMOC where he was meeting to discuss rebuilding a school and work on a prospective sewer network."

Perhaps much of the opposition to change is a belief that current systems are adapting quickly

enough. One example was cited by Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Mike Hagee, who told AFJ that training with NGOs was already being done.

While it's true that real-world experience and joint experimentation have prompted some promising initiatives, cooperation continues to be primarily ad hoc and insufficient. For example, the Army's Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA) partnered with an NGO to hold events aimed at providing instruction to Army officers about the significant role of humanitarian organizations. In another initiative, the Army Command and General Staff College incorporates NGOs at the small group level to assist officers in planning for crisis response. Also, the Joint Readiness Training Cen-

ter, other national training centers and the services incorporate limited "NGO play" in exercises such as the Marine Corps' recent Emerald Express exercise. But none of these initiatives rises to the level of training needed throughout the U.S. military establishment, particularly at its upper echelons. On a more promising note, though, the SOCom and Bundeswehr events gave rise to flashes of brilliance at the upper operational and strategic levels.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Defense Department was slow to embrace its post-war roles. Similarly, the State Department found itself (and it still remains) woefully underfunded, undermanned and unprepared to manage its responsibilities in those countries. The overall U.S. government response

to the many stabilization challenges in both countries was inconsistent, at best. In large measure, the inability of government agencies to effectively identify and use the capabilities of NGOs is at the heart of these shortcomings.

In theory, at least, NGO integration is alive and well — the subject proliferates throughout JCD&E concepts, strategies and objectives. However, there is no joint-force operational or integrating concept under development or even scheduled for consideration.

The charter of the Pentagon's JCD&E proponent lists nongovernmental organizations as "key stakeholders" and mandates their inclusion in appropriate exercises and war-fighting experiments; however, the same organization in October terminated support that had been geared to future NGO participation in fiscal 2005. At the same time, funding for NGO programs at the Army Command and General Staff College, SATFA, service-sponsored exercises and during JCD&E are

dwindling. Large defense contractors advocate replacing the representatives from NGOs who participated in these events with high-cost contract employees — self-professed "NGO subject matter experts" — to role play as NGOs.

Their "assistance" isn't needed. Solutions have been worked out by soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, commanders and NGOs, working together on the ground. The only catalyst required is to encourage innovation.

What is needed is a neutral collaborative capability for all partners who desire it — perhaps a unified NGO resource center, operated by a nongovernmental third party, often (though not always) staffed with robust U.S. government representation.

At least one NGO already has made a proposal along these lines. The idea involves establishing a Global Context Center accessible to NGO, JCD&E and interagency communities. The GCC would be a state-of-the-art facility that would stimulate global collabora-

The greatest obstacle is not that no one wants to fix the problem; rather, it is that no one feels it is their job to do it.

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A U.S. Navy MH-60S Seahawk helicopter takes off from the hospital ship Mercy with boxes containing the personal belongings of a group of health care workers from the nongovernmental organization Project HOPE during the tsunami relief effort in the Indian Ocean region.

tion, conduct assessments using quantifiable metrics, and fuse information relating to current, potential, projected and possible complex emergencies. With an adaptive organizational structure, it would allow collaborative partners to experiment, train and educate participants, creating a bridge between civil-military operations centers, provincial reconstruction teams and other government structures.

As an NGO participant in a recent joint experiment suggested in an after-exercise report: "The U.S. government must lead efforts to ensure interoperability between governments, international organizations and NGOs. We recommend that the U.S. military work with NGOs ... to lead the creation of a common 'humanitarian operations' language that can be quickly learned by NGOs and easily understood by the military and [interagency] community."

While creation of such a language would require substantial

initial effort on the part of the U.S. government, the dividends realized through enhanced interoperability with NGOs on the ground would be great, especially by making the learning curve less steep during the initial stages of an operation.

An interesting analogy can be made with the Internet: Perhaps the main reason for the Internet's growth and success was the initial creation of common protocols based on the lowest possible common denominator for functionality. In other words, the creation of a simple set of operational terms emphasizing interoperability over capability allowed a great diversity of applications to quickly develop and flourish. This process eventually resulted in dramatically more overall capability than would have been created if capability had been the initial focus.

The same degree of foresight is needed to harness the tremendous capabilities of NGOs. Retired Maj. Gen. Ken Bowra, a JCD&E senior concept developer, captured the

importance of doing this when he said: "NGO's cannot be ignored. They are a critical ingredient to solving immediate and long-term problems. The challenge is how to coordinate these capable and resourced organizations into the right areas."

Presently, the greatest obstacle to more effective NGO collaboration is not that no one wants to fix the problem; rather, it is that no one feels it is their job to do it. Clearly, though, it is past time that someone should have been given responsibility and authority for getting it done.

It remains to be seen if those who have the ability and the resources to support the grassroots trend toward a solution will do so, or whether the entrenched mindset of the State Department Country Team representative at the SOCom experiment will prevail. Recall that he noted: "We have the most perfect system in the world; you just don't know how to use it." ■

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